The Battle Of Deothal And Bhakti Thapa
By Mrs. LAXMI THAPA ET AL
April 16, 1815 should have gone down in the history of the South Asian sub-continent as a day of great sacrifice in the struggle against European domination. Unfortunately, very few Nepalese know about the significance of the day. It is the day when the bravery of Nepalese people became a legend in the world. The courage and gallantry shown by the Nepalese might have badly shaken the determination of the enemy to subdue Nepal and turn it into a European colony. It was on this very day when 74-year-old Bhakti Thapa led a counterattack against an enemy far superior in strength at Deothal to protect the honour of Nepal and its proud people.
In order to evaluate the true historical significance of April 16, 1815, it is important to know the sequence of events before and after the Deothal Battle. On that day, Bhakti Thapa had personally led the Nepalese counterattack. Bhakti Thapa laid down his life in the battlefield. Casualties on both sides were very high. It is said that a column of about 400 Nepalese soldiers had taken part in the attack and almost all of them were either killed or wounded.
Bravery of Bhakti Thapa
Nepalese historians have presented the Deothal Battle almost exclusively from the angle of describing the exceptional bravery of the Bhakti Thapa. They have not tried to analyze why Bhakti Thapa, who was in charge of virtually the whole Nepalese army at the height of the Nepal's unification period, had to launch the suicidal attack. Was this big sacrifice paid off? For Britishers, the attack must have come as a great shock. Here, one is reminded of the British General James Cardigan who led the charge of the Light Brigade of the cavalry against the Russians in the Battle of Balaklava, several years later on October 25, 1854, during the Crimean War.
The charge of the Light Brigade was the climax of the battle. Due to the wrong communication of the command, the Light Brigade under the command of James Cardigan headed towards the main Russian position, instead of the isolated redoubts. The brigade came under fire from the Russian batteries for about 20 minutes, but fortunately the attack was supported by two squadrons of the French Chasseurs d'Afrique by covering the flank. It is said that the attack was one of the most famous military blunders in history. Nevertheless, the charge of the Light Brigade so struck the imagination of the British public that Cardigan was lionized on his return to England, where he was appointed inspector general of cavalry. The famous poem by Alfred, Lord Tennyson " Charge of the Light Brigade" immortalized the bravery of the James Cardigan though the circumstance leading to the charge of the Light Brigade was nothing more than a kind of accident that happened unexpectedly.
The Britishers were thoroughly shaken by the bravery of Nepalese in the Deothal Battle. Bhakti Thapa became a legend in their eyes. Historian CB Khanduri writes quoting various contemporary British historians "The euphemism of the Bravest Of The Braves had been used by Napoleon for Marshal Ney, whose bravery during the retreat from Moscow in 1812 was one of the highest. Brave Les Brave, said Napoleon of him. The British then used this citation for the Gurkhas during and after the Anglo-Nepal War. Such was the bravery shown by Bhakti Thapa that the next legend of the Bravest of the Braves had been created on the day April 16, 1815 at Deothal."
Before the Deothal Battle
The process of expansion of the Great Nepal had spread like wildfire across the Himalayan region. The western boundary of the Great Nepal was pushed across a distance of about 400 km within a very short period of just two years. So it was natural for the Britishers to be greatly alarmed. We can draw such conclusion from the circumstances surrounding the visit of the Kirkpatrick to Kathmandu in 1793. British governor general in India had agreed to send Kirkpatrick to mediate in Nepal-China dispute. Kirkpatrick did not even set out for Nepal until after the war had been successfully terminated by the Nepal-China agreement. The governor general was requested not to send Kirkpatrick since the war had been amicably concluded. Surprisingly the governor general was seen adamant on sending a man to Kathmandu. So Kirkpatrick visited Kathmandu for no specific official purpose. The intention of Kirkpatrick's visit could hardly be anything else but to watch closely the growing military activities in Nepal and to ascertain that such activities were not going to be directed against the British India in near future.
Great Nepal was seen all along as a threat to British rule in India till the end of Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16. Similarly, the Marathas in the south were also posing threat to the expansion of British rule in India. From the perspective of the Britishers, the direct linkage between the Great Nepal and the Marathas would have posed the most serious threat to their rule in India. Amidst these political developments in the South Asian sub-continent comes the 1809 Amritsar Treaty between Ranjit Singh and British India. Surprisingly, David Ochterlony, who played a decisive role in defeating Nepal in 1814-16 Anglo-Nepal War, was responsible to arrange the signing of the Amritsar Treaty. The Amritsar Treaty was certainly a ploy to block further expansion of the Great Nepal. Was it also a carefully planned action to prevent Marathas and the Great Nepal joining in a fight against British rule in India? Such possibility deserves to be carefully analyzed in future.
The Anglo- Nepal War
The British began preparations for the war from the time when F.R. Hastings-Earl of Moira landed in India as Governor-General and Commander-in- Chief in 1813. The actual declaration of war against Nepal is recorded as November 1, 1814, though the war began from middle of October. The decision to declare war had been made six months earlier so the territorial dispute appears to be only a pretext. The British force had marched into Nepal across a frontier of more than 1500 km to attack at several points at the same time The eastern British flank was moving north from the Teesta area whereas the farthermost western flank from the Sutlej river area. It was virtually a modern-type warfare extended over a period of three calendar years and necessitating to protect the entire region bordering the enemy held territory. The British invasion force, in comparison with Nepalese, had absolute superiority in cavalry, pioneers, and at least the superiority of 10 times in infantry and 100 times in artillery. They also had the advantage of manoeuvrability in movement of their fighting force.
The Britishers were expecting a blitzkrieg victory. It is said that Governor-General Hastings had planned to win the war in one mighty sweep in one to two months in end 1814 but certainly before the Christmas. He was badly mistaken in his assessment. We Nepalese fought very bravely. In early months of the war, the initial British invasion was completely beaten off. The British rule in India was at a risk of falling apart. Unfortunately at that time the Sikhs and Marathas did not join Nepal in liberating the whole of the South Asian subcontinent from the grip of the European domination. Britishers had at their disposal virtually unlimited resources from the Nepalese perspective. They continued to press Nepal all across the frontier that stretched over a distance of more than 1500 km. Nepalese resources were being sharply depleted. There was not any chance to be replenished. So the ability of the Nepalese force to defend the territory under their control was steadily declining. They were forced to pull back. There was breakdown in control and command system. Toward the middle of 1815, Amar Singh Thapa, chief of the Nepalese force fighting in the western front, was confined within a small area of the Malaun fort. The fate of Nepal was going to be in the hand of Governor-General Lord Hastings, unashamedly imperialistic and who became famous for having established the British Empire in India more firmly than before. At that time there could not be any room for doubt in his intention either to eliminate Nepal completely and bring it under the British rule or to turn it into a vassal state like so many other states
under that category in British India. He could be forced not to take any such decision detrimental to the honor of Nepal only if he perceived that such action could pose serious threat to the continuance of British rule in India. The Deothal Battle could not be anything else but a clear message of threat from Bhakti Thapa on behalf of Nepalese people to the Britishers warning them not to take lightly the determination of Nepalese people to protect the honor of the country.
A Prelude To Deothal Battle
In early months of the war, the British offensive ended in complete failure. The Nepalese force stationed within the shelter of the fortress were not only able to defend their position against an invading enemy many times superior in strength but they even shocked them by their dreadful counteroffensive that used to be accompanied by big losses on British side. After the initial defeats, the Britishers changed their strategy to avoid their casualties. They started to deploy long range guns to level the fortification and force the enemy to flee. This strategy paid off. The Britishers were able to advance quickly into the territory under our control. They even used elephants to carry heavy guns across the mountains. A day before the Deothal Battle the Britishers were able to bring to the Deothal height their artillery guns to level the Malaun fortress where the headquarter of the Amar Singh Thapa was located.
Kamikaze Brigade In Action
Toward the sunset of April 15 evening, Bhakti Thapa and the army units under him arrived at the Malaun fort from their station at Surajgarh without being noticed by the British army units scattered around the Malaun fortress. The subsequent events help to explain that he might have come to persuade Amar Singh Thapa on behalf of all the brave commanders prepared to sacrifice their life for the country to pursue more aggressive methods to deter the enemy from overrunning the motherland. He might have even advised him to pull back from the Maluan to regroup the army units spread all across the Garwal and Kumaun to go to a completely new type of offensive.
The following day in the morning Bhakti Thapa led a kamikaze-type counterattack against the British force entrenched at Deothal. Historians have presented the description of this battle at great length. It was 3.15 a.m. when a force of 400 under Bhakti Thapa marched out of the Malaun fort, to a slow but steady beat of a drum. The British column under Thompson had taken position at Deothal on reverse slopes. The cannons of 6 pounders were properly concealed. There were two Indian battalions, the Grenadiers companies of the Light Battalions and some 1000 Irregulars. The British strength was up to about 3,500 troops and weapons.
Bhakti Thapa and his followers in the counterattack appeared to have vowed to fight to the death. Bhakti Thapa had even handed his infant grandson in the custody of the Amar Singh Thapa just before going to the battlefield. It was a bloody battle. It would not be wrong to visualize that the Khukri charge and the battle cry of the Nepalese fighters might have shaken the enemies with fear. RP Ochterlony, the author of "Sketches Of The Goorka War" has written. A body of Gorkhas advancing to charge bears no resemblance to a European column. Several huge trumpets putting up a harsh but stirring noise, set the multitude in motion who, except some carry shields, grasping each a matchlock in his left hand and a broad sword in his right, rush on, disregarding all regularity, very like a pack of hounds in full cry.
Bhakti Thapa laid down his life in the battlefield. Everyone who fought from the Nepalese side was either killed or wounded. The British casualties were also very high. The Britishers have praised their officers and soldiers for their bravery in the battle. According to one account, the British casualties of dead and wounded in Deothal battle were 384 as against 390 Nepalese casualties - almost a ratio of one to one, under the most adverse conditions to the Nepalese.
After the Deothal Battle
Historian Khanduri writes that Bhakti Thapa had impressed the Gorkha commanders during the War of Consolidation and joined those who were to be the eventual ruler of Nepal. Kazi Amar Singh Thapa had treaded in the footsteps of Bhakti Thapa. The battle strategy demonstrated by Bhakti Thapa in the Deothal Battle would have been very effective in defeating the British force. We know now that this type of fighting strategy had enabled even very small countries like Vietnam or Afghanistan to defeat superpowers like the USA and the former USSR. If the Anglo-Nepal conflict would have stretched over a longer period accompanied by kamikaze-type attacks, Britishers could be forced to pull back. The East India Company mainly interested to make profits would not have been interested to finance the war without an end.
At a time when the brave Nepalese fighters might have been preparing for more Deothal-type battles, the horrific news of the fall of the Kumaun would have come right out of the blue and hit like thunderbolt. It was the greatest misfortune in the history of our country that about a week after the Deothal Battle, the Nepalese governor of the Kumaun virtually without any major battle signed an agreement to surrender and evacuate from the lands to the west of the Mahakali river. Thus, the Mahakali river became the Nepal's western border. It might appear that the great sacrifice made in Deothal Battle proved to be futile. In reality, that battle had far-reaching impact on Anglo-Nepal relationship. The possibility to face Deothal-type battles in any future conflict against Nepal must have deterred Britishers from interfering in Nepal's internal affairs and thus forcing them to treat Nepal in every respect as a completely independent country.
(Laxmi Thapa writes on history)
...........now thatzz somethin' to be proud of!!!!!
